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Risk

Risk disclosure

Read this before you launch, buy or hold anything here. It is short on purpose.

Memecoins can go to zero

Every coin on Sapling is a memecoin. Most have no product, no team and no reason to hold value. Prices move fast and can fall to zero. Only trade with money you can lose entirely.

The liquidity is shared

Sapling's liquidity is protocol-owned $SAPLING/ZEC liquidity on PumpSwap. Its LP tokens are burned, so nobody can withdraw it, and it belongs to no holder and no coin: it does not back any single coin, and holding a coin gives you no claim on it. Harvest has closed.

pump.fun dependency

Coins, curves and pools live on pump.fun and PumpSwap, which Sapling does not control. pump.fun can change its fees, reassign a coin's creator (which stops that coin's creator fee reaching the split), change how Token-2022 coins are minted, or remove ZEC from its list of allowed quote mints. Any of these can stop new fees, new launches or trading through this site. Liquidity already added sits in a PumpSwap pool, so it depends on PumpSwap too.

Bridge risk

The ZEC Sapling coins trade in is not native Zcash. It is bridged by NEAR's Omni Bridge and its value depends on that bridge holding the underlying ZEC. If the bridge is hacked, paused or shut down, that ZEC can lose value or become unredeemable, and the $SAPLING/ZEC liquidity holds exactly that token. It also has none of Zcash's privacy properties.

Smart-contract risk

Your funds pass through several programs: sapling_vault, pump.fun, PumpSwap and Jupiter. Any of them can have a bug or be exploited. A flaw in sapling_vault could let the LP pot be drained; a flaw in the others could affect trades, swaps and the liquidity. Audits reduce this risk but do not remove it.

Admin key risk

sapling_vault has an admin key, held by the operator, and the program can be upgraded only by a 2-of-3 Squads multisig: two of its three members must approve an upgrade, and no single key can. The admin can pause a coin and, while it is paused, move ZEC left in its own vault to one fixed recovery address; it cannot move the LP pot or the liquidity. If the admin key is stolen, an attacker can do the same. If two of the three multisig keys were stolen, a malicious program version could drain the LP pot. The program stays upgradeable. The addresses are in the Docs.

Not investment advice

Nothing on this site is financial, investment, legal or tax advice. The operator is not a licensed adviser. Liquidity figures, market caps and prices are shown for information only and can be stale. You are responsible for your own decisions and for the rules that apply where you live. See also the terms.